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ABSTRACT 
Several philosophers of science claim that scientific toy models afford knowledge 
of possibility, but answers to the question of why toy models can be expected to 
competently play this role are scarce. The main line of reply is that toy models 
support possibility claims insofar as they are credible. I raise a challenge for this 
credibility-thesis, drawing on a familiar problem for imagination-based modal 
epistemologies, and argue that it remains unanswered in the current literature. 
The credibility-thesis has a long way to go if it is to account for the epistemic 





1. Credible toy models 
A typical scientific model is an artificial system, composed of a concrete or mathematical structure 
with an intended interpretation, that scientists use to learn about the world. For example, one can 
learn about the behaviour of an aircraft by studying a scale model in a wind tunnel; or about 
meteorological phenomena by manipulating a computer simulation, interpreted in terms of the 
weather system. 
Toy models are very abstract, simple, and highly idealized models. Stock examples include 
Schelling’s checkerboard (1971), Akerlof’s ‘market for lemons’ (1970), Maynard Smith and Price’s 
Hawk-Dove game (1973), and the Lotka-Volterra model of predator-prey dynamics. Toy models 
of e.g. markets or populations, are very dissimilar to, and exclude factors known to influence, actual 
markets or populations, and contain idealisations not susceptible to de-idealisation methods. 
Some toy models are ‘embedded’ in an empirically confirmed theory, and their epistemic 
merit piggybacks on the merits of that theory. But many prominent toy models, including the 
examples above, are not embedded but autonomous (Reutlinger et al. 2018). Scientists evidently find 
autonomous toy models epistemically useful, despite lack of framework theory, but their epistemic 
merit presents a puzzle. What, and how, can they teach us about the world? 
A number of authors – e.g. Gelfert (2019), Grüne-Yanoff (2009), Reutlinger et al. (2018), 
Weisberg (2013) – suggest that autonomous toy models give us modal knowledge, in particular by 
supporting objective possibility claims.1 This raises a question: in virtue of what can can toy models 
help scientists gauge the possible? An influential answer, due to Sugden (2000), and taken on board 
by several others (e.g. Fumagalli 2016, 437; Grüne-Yanoff 2009, 95; Mäki 2009, 39-40), suggests 
that they do so insofar as they are credible.2 I refer to this, i.e. the thesis that the credibility of a toy 
model is evidence of possibility of the model result (appropriately interpreted) as Credibility. 
Credibility is a claim in modal epistemology, i.e. about how we learn modal truths. As such, 
it should be subjected to the same scrutiny as other such claims. I will argue that Credibility faces 
a challenge analogous to a well-known problem for imagination-based modal epistemologies. This 
 
1 I examine only this claim, and leave open whether they also have other epistemic import.   
2 Sugden additionally claims that we can move from the possibility-conclusion to claims about actual target systems. 
That claim is irrelevant to my discussion, but see Grüne-Yanoff (2009, 89-91) for criticism. 
 2 
has hitherto not been acknowledged by philosophers of science. The challenge must be met in 
order for Credibility to illuminate the epistemic contribution of toy models. 
 
2. Credibility in action: Schelling’s checkerboard 
Thomas Schelling’s much-discussed checkerboard model consists of a two-dimensional grid with 
two types of individuals, say circular and triangular, initially distributed randomly on the grid. 
Individuals move on the grid according to one rule: if not at least one-third of individuals on 
neighbouring squares are of the same type, move to an empty square where that condition is 
fulfilled. That is, individuals are happy to ‘live’ in mixed areas, as long as they are not in a strong 
minority. After relatively few iterations, this generates a ‘segregated’ grid with triangles and circles 
in separate clusters. 
It is commonly agreed that Schelling’s model taught us something about residential 
segregation in cities. But the model system’s high level of abstraction, simplification, and 
dissimilarity to real cities and populations, makes it hard to see how it could justify conclusions 
about any actual target. Instead, it is suggested that the model describes a possible mechanism behind 
the actual phenomenon of segregation (it gives a how-possibly explanation). In short, Schelling’s 
checkerboard gives us a piece of modal knowledge: it is possible for racial segregation to result 
despite individual citizens’ preference for living in mixed areas. Such modal knowledge can 
contribute to different projects of interest to science. For instance, Ylikoski and Aydinonat (2014, 
30) notes that Schelling’s model ‘expanded the menu of possible causes’, which in turn is important 
for various scientific explanatory efforts. According to Grüne-Yanoff (2013), Schelling’s model 
was important partly because it helped distinguish the contingent from the necessary – arguably an 
important part of science. The possibility claim it supported, contradicted the entertained 
hypothesis that segregation is necessarily a consequence of racist preferences.  
According to Credibility, Schelling’s model provides evidence for the possibility claim above 
because it is credible. The toy model’s formal structure is interpreted by users as an imaginary 
world, which, if credible, indicates that the model results is possible. 
[W]e see Schelling’s checkerboard cities as possible cities (…) We recognize (…) that the 
model world could be real – that it describes a state of affairs that is credible (Sugden 2000, 
25).  
While suggestive, Sugden’s notion of ‘credibility’ needs specification. The best current attempt at 
elaborating what it means for a model to be credible is due to Grüne-Yanoff (2009) who picks up 
on Sugden’s claim that credibility in models is ‘rather like credibility in “realistic” novels’ (2000, 
25). When confronted with a fiction, one imagines a fictional world, proceeding from the 
information in the text, but going beyond it by filling gaps, adding detail, drawing out implications. 
When assessing the fiction for credibility, one assesses this imagined world. Grüne-Yanoff argues 
that analogously, scientific modellers imagine a model world, proceeding from but going beyond 
(as above), the model description, and this world can be assessed for credibility.3 
A fiction can be credible even if its particulars deviate extensively from what the actual world 
is like. This highlights that the relevant sense of credibility is not believability. What matters is, first, 
internal coherence: the imagined fictional world must be sufficiently detailed and free of 
contradiction. Moreover, the development in the fictional world must be plausible conditional on the 
information provided about preferences, environment, etc. In short, what matters is how the whole 
thing fits together (Grüne-Yanoff 2009, 94–95; Sugden 2000, 26), in some more substantial sense 
I’ll refer to as internal cohesion. The same goes for a model. The individual model assumptions 
may deviate from what we know about the world, yet the system described by the model may be 
credible, as long as the assumptions and subsequent development fit together cohesively. 
 
 
3 Some philosophers argue that models are fictions (Godfrey-Smith 2009; Salis forthcoming). Fictionalism goes well 
with Credibility, but neither Credibility nor my argument below depends on it. 
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3. The Problem of Modal Epistemic Friction 
Credibility attempts to account for the epistemic contribution of toy models. It rests on a claim 
about an epistemic route to modal truth, namely via the construction and study of credible models, 
and is thus on a par with other theses in the epistemology of modality. I argue that a well-known 
challenge for imagination-based modal epistemologies arises also for Credibility.  
Several modal epistemologists (e.g. Kung 2010; Yablo 1993) have advanced some form of 
the claim that one can find out whether p is possible by attempting to imagine – in some relevant 
sense – a scenario in which p is true. If one has imagined a p-scenario, one is (absent defeaters) 
justified in believing that p is possible. A driving assumption behind imagination-based modal 
epistemology is that we can access what we imagine, and reliably judge whether we have managed 
to imagine a p-scenario. The property of being imaginable acts as an epistemically accessible 
mediator – as evidence of something we cannot directly judge, namely possibility. 
But imagination-based modal epistemologies must deal with the fact that we can imagine 
impossible scenarios.4 For instance, it seems we can imagine that silver has a different atomic 
number than 47. So imagination, or assessment thereof, must be kept in check in order to be a 
reliable guide to possibility. In a recent paper on this well-known issue, Vaidya and Wallner (2018) 
call it the problem of modal epistemic friction. It arises for imagination-based modal epistemologies 
in the form of a question:  
Under what circumstances, can I be confident that my ability to imagine a scenario in which 
I judge p to be the case, is evidence that p is possible?  
A trivial answer is: as long as there are no defeaters. For instance, we have independent reason to 
think that the imagined is impossible in the silver-case, so we won’t follow imagination in the wrong 
direction. But presumably those who appeal to imagination think that in many cases, the 
imaginative exercise is our best, or only, source of evidence with respect to the prospective 
possibility. So there must be something which provides epistemic ‘friction’, making imagination 
track modal truth. 
There are two main avenues of response available. First, one can specify a mode of 
imagination, which is plausibly a reliable guide to modal truth (Chalmers 2002). A problem with 
this strategy is that the new idealised notion of imaginability is often somewhat artificial. Moreover, 
it might undermine accessibility – a key motivation for appealing to imagination – as it is unclear 
whether ordinary epistemic subjects can tell a probative kind of imagining from a spurious one 
(Roca-Royes 2011; Worley 2003). Second, one can require that imagination, or assessment thereof, 
be constrained by some background knowledge that prevents us from imagining the impossible, 
or judging that what we have imagined is possible when it isn’t. A modal epistemologist taking this 
avenue must (1) specify what the relevant background knowledge is, and (2) spell out how it is 
acquired. 
Now, Sugden and Grüne-Yanoff take credibility to be a property that both fictions and 
models can have. Some of Credibility’s intuitive pull comes from the assumption that we have at 
least a tacit grasp on, and an ability to judge, when a fiction is credible. Assessment of toy models 
is then said to work in the same way. As in the case of imaginability, the property of being credible 
acts as a mediator – accessible evidence of possibility, something we cannot judge directly. 
If we take the analogy with fiction seriously, Credibility faces an analogous epistemic friction 
challenge. Fictions can describe (physically or metaphysically) impossible worlds. Consider Philip 
K. Dick’s The Minority Report, premised on the existence of individuals endowed with precognition, 
where the police division, with the help of ‘precogs’, can arrest people about to commit crimes 
before the act and, sometimes, before the thought has occurred to the would-be-criminal-offender. 
Or, as Nolan (forthcoming) describes, an early 20th century sci-fi centrally featuring disturbance in 
the (Lorentzian) ether, caused by a massive generator. 
 
4 See Kung (2016) for several examples. 
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If credibility just amounts to internal cohesion, there is no obvious reason to deem these 
fictions incredible. The Minority Report neither says nor implies that the form of backwards causation 
required for precognition is metaphysically impossible. If this is right, credible fictions sometimes 
describe impossibilities. If fictions and models are credible in the same sense, then some credible 
toy models may describe impossible systems. So: 
Under what circumstances can I be confident that the credibility of a model is evidence of 
the possibility of its result?  
Again, something must provide the appropriate modal epistemic friction. 
The friend of Credibility also has two avenues of response available. First, she could specify 
a sense of ‘credible’ that plausibly tracks possibility. She might deny that the problem of credible 
but impossible fictions carries over to models, because models are credible in a different sense than 
fictions, and no credible model describes an impossible system. But if fiction-credibility and model-
credibility are different properties, what is model-credibility? We were supposed to gain an intuitive 
grasp via the analogy with fiction, but now that route to the concept is off-limits. Moreover, 
whatever model-credibility is, why think we are good judges of whether a model world has this 
property? The analogy with fiction gave us reason to think we have epistemic access to model-
credibility too, but once the two notions of credibility are pulled apart, that reason is lost.  
The other avenue involves restricting credibility with appropriate background knowledge, 
and say that our judgement that a toy model is credible is evidence of possibility just in case the 
credibility-assessment is informed by the right background knowledge. This seems to generate the 
right result for the fictions described above. If one does feel any pull to say that those fictions are 
incredible, this is likely because e.g. scientific knowledge informs the credibility-assessment. The 
developments in the fictions are incredible, conditional on that knowledge. In contrast, what reason 
would a reader of the ether-fiction, alive prior to, or otherwise unaware of, certain scientific 
progress, have to find the fiction incredible? None, it seems – and the apparent credibility of the 
story might lead her astray with respect to possibilities. 
Grüne-Yanoff writes that the judgements of credibility are ‘driven by empathy, 
understanding, and intuition’ (2009, 94–95), but says nothing of whose intuitions, or understanding 
of what. Appealing to possession of appropriate background knowledge is one way to fill that out. 
The background knowledge in question can be tacit, but one must possess it in order to rely on it. 
As with imagination-based modal epistemologies, this avenue brings the further challenges of (1) 
specifying what the relevant background knowledge is, and (2) spelling out how that knowledge is 
acquired. They currently remain unaddressed. 
 
4. What background knowledge? 
Since the aim is objective and not epistemic possibility, one should not hold fixed everything one 
knows about the actual world. But what background knowledge needs to inform credibility-
assessments? Notably, it cannot be required that one justifiably accepts a theory of the relevant 
phenomena5 (e.g. segregation) since Credibility is supposed to account for the epistemic import of 
autonomous toy models that are, by definition, not embedded in theory. Indeed, the fact that toy 
models are often used to further research of phenomena for which there are no systematic theories, 
adds an extra wrinkle to the need for background knowledge as friction-provider. 
Importantly, what counts as a satisfactory reply to the modal epistemic friction challenge, 
depends on the relevant notion of modality. There are more and less restricted objective modal 
notions, and any given p may be possible in some senses but not others. Modal epistemologists are 
often interested in the least restricted notion, metaphysical possibility. For science, a prominent 
one is physical possibility (possibility given the actual laws of nature), but there are others, e.g. 
mathematical, biological, and practical possibility. Since at least some of these clearly come apart 
 
5 This rules out adapting a modal epistemology like Fischer’s (2017). 
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in scope, different background knowledge is required to inform credibility-judgements depending 
on what kind of possibility they are supposed to be a guide to.6 
As Verreault-Julien (2019) points out, not all models are meant to support possibility claims 
of the same kind. This is presumably true also of toy models. At one point, Sugden writes that that 
credibility-judgements are conditioned on ‘what we know (…) about the general laws governing 
events in the real world’ (2000, 25). This passage is interpreted by others (e.g. Grüne-Yanoff 2009, 
92) as the idea that credibility involves compatibility with the laws of nature. A corresponding 
response to (1) is that judging a model to be credible is evidence of possibility, just in case that 
judgement is informed by knowledge of the laws of nature.  
Insofar as toy models aim to justify claims of physical possibility, this is a potential answer 
to (1) – it is plausible enough that credibility-judgements restricted by knowledge of the laws of 
nature, would be suitable guides to physical possibility. But while I am happy to grant that some toy 
models aim for physical possibility, far from all do. Importantly, the stock examples in the literature 
don’t. For instance, it is implausible that Schelling’s model is supposed to show that segregation is 
physically possible despite individuals’ preferences for mixed areas. Nor does it seem right to say the 
Hawk-Dove model supports the claim that it is physically possible that a trait like restraint in combat 
results from individual selection alone. Likely more restricted modalities are of interest here. I 
submit that this generalises: knowledge of natural laws will not account for very much of the 
epistemic work that toy models are supposed to be doing, as much of the relevant modelling is 
from economics, biology, or computational sociology, where physical possibility does not seem to 
be at issue. 
But if so, it is insufficient if these models are credible in the sense informed by nomological 
knowledge, because that indicates possibility only in a less restricted sense. This comes out 
especially in relation to rebuttal of necessity hypotheses, one task for toy models. Compare: 
showing the metaphysical possibility of superluminal travel does nothing to rebut the claim that it is 
physically necessary that nothing with mass travels faster than the speed of light. Some other 
knowledge needs to bear on credibility-assessments in order to support the right possibility claims.  
It won’t do to suggest that credibility-assessment of these models should be informed by 
knowledge of more specific laws that govern the relevant domain. The special and social sciences 
feature remarkably few law-like principles, that also do not hold without exception (Gelfert 2016, 
63; Grüne-Yanoff 2009, 92). 
This in turn highlights that it is not clear what sense(s) of possibility is relevant in fields like 
biology, economics, or sociology. Without a grasp of that, we cannot say what knowledge is 
required to restrict credibility-assessments that allegedly track it. Imagination-based modal 
epistemologies typically aspire to be guides to metaphysical possibility, which presents challenges 
of its own. But philosophers of science need to say more about the kind(s) of possibility knowledge 
toy models afford – especially since possibility in those senses cannot be understood in terms of 
laws, analogously to physical possibility. So, we add an item to the to-do list for those who appeal 
to Credibility in elucidating the epistemic merit of toy models: (0) identify the sense(s) of possibility 
relevant to toy modelling practices. 
 
5. Conclusion 
According to some philosophers of science, Credibility elucidates the epistemic contribution of toy 
models. But Credibility faces an analogue of the epistemic friction challenge for imagination-based 
modal epistemologies. In order to meet it, and account for the epistemic import of toy models, 
friends of Credibility must (0) identify the sense(s) of possibility relevant to toy modelling practices; 
 
6 Here is an interesting parallel with credibility in fiction, which is more complex than what Sugden and Grüne-Yanoff 
makes it out to be. Fictions may be credible in different ways: scientifically (aspired to by ‘hard science fiction’ writes), 
psychologically, or morally. Presumably, different beliefs (e.g. moral, scientific) are brought to bear in the credibility-
assessment, depending on the relevant sense of credibility. 
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(1) specify what kind(s) of background knowledge should inform credibility-assessment; and (2) 
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